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THE HIGH COST OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN CHILD
ABUSE CASES - IS THE PRICE WORTH PAYING?
BY BRUCE E. BOHLMAN*
This article examines the law regarding child witness protec-
tion in sexual abuse cases. The Courts are faced with an increasing
number of criminal actions against alleged child abusers, and it is
useful to analyze the role of the judge and the balancing process
that must be used, at least in criminal cases, to assure constitu-
tional protections are afforded to the defendant without causing
undue psychological harm to the child. Constitutional protections
do have a price, and when that price includes trauma to a child
witness, the cost/benefit ratio is subject to emotional debate. This
article reviews the competing interests, suggests that existing rules
of evidence may be used to resolve part of the dilemma, and con-
cludes with an observation that the criminal law may not be as
effective in remedying the problem of child sexual abuse as civil
remedies that are specifically tailored to meet the needs of the
child.
I. THE PROBLEM OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
Child sexual abuse will be a major legal and societal concern
in the 1990s. Between 1981 and 1985, reports of child abuse and
neglect rose by more than 54.9 percent nationwide.' In 1985,
1,876,564 children were reported to child protection agencies as
the victims of alleged abuse and neglect.2 It is estimated that one-
fourth of all females will be molested before they reach age four-
teen and one-third by age eighteen.3 For every reported case of
incest, twenty-five go unreported. 4 A study of 796 college stu-
dents in 1979 found that nineteen percent of the females and
seven percent of the males had been sexually abused as children.-
Females outnumbered male victims by a ten to one ratio, and the
average age under sixteen for female victims was eleven years of
* Judge of the District Court, Northeast Central Judicial District, North Dakota.
1. Abused Children in America: Victims of Official Neglect, Report of the Select
Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, H.R. REP. No. 260, 100th Cong. 1st. Sess.
(1987).
2. Id.
3. Lambert, Victims Have Rights Too, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 449, 449.
4. Saunders, The Child Sexual Abuse Case, [1988 Winter] THE JUDrE'S JOURNAL 20,
22.
5. Id.
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age.8 Only thirteen percent of child victims were assaulted by
strangers with the remainder of offenders being family members,
friends, neighbors, baby-sitters, coaches, scout leaders, or
teachers.7
Child victims as witnesses present very difficult problems for
the courts. The primary issue that this article addresses regards
the extent to which the child witness should be subjected to and
protected from the trauma associated with testifying, assuming
that the witness has been found to be competent.
Happily, there are relatively few cases where it becomes nec-
essary for the child to testify, and about one in fifty children actu-
ally find themselves in the courtroom with the remainder having
their cases settled before trial.8
In recent years, a significant number of sensational alleged
child sexual abuse cases have received national attention, includ-
ing the proceedings from Jordan, Minnesota; the Rogers Park Jew-
ish Community Center of Chicago, Illinois; and the Manhattan
Beach, California, McMartin Preschool. These cases illustrate the
disturbing societal phenomena that not only are individual chil-
dren subjected to sexual abuse, but large numbers of children can
be allegedly victimized by perpetrators in positions of trust and
authority. %
Sexual abuse charges were dropped against twenty-one
defendants in Jordan, Minnesota, and two defendants were acquit-
ted. Charges were dropped against five of seven defendants in the
McMartin Preschool case, and the only person charged in the Rog-
ers Park case was acquitted.9
In the McMartin Preschool case, it was noted that psychiatrists
had used leading questions in interviews of the children, and the
children were thereby encouraged to top the stories of their
peers.10
6. Id. at 23.
7. Id. at 40.
8. Id. at 23.
9. Moss, Are the Children Lying?, 73 A.B.AJ. 59, 60-62 (May 1987). Roland Summit, a
psychologist at the Harbor/UCLA Medical Center, attempts to explain the acquittals or
dismissals in the Jordan and McMartin cases in three possible ways:
Either there are a number of people who have discovered a way to entrap
preschool children; or this is a case of mass hysteria fomented by naive people; or
these cases are, at the core, conventional child molestation cases in which the
victims have somehow exaggerated the experiences into fantasy.
Id. at 59. Since the Summit article was written in 1987, the two remaining defendants in
the McMartin case were acquitted on 52 charges and one defendant faced 13 additional
charges. THE NEw YORK TIMEs, March 5, 1990, at All, col. 1.
10. Moss, supra note 9 at 60. One of the children's mothers, who was mentally ill,
580 [Vol. 66:579
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In the Jordan, Minnesota case, the children were subjected to
numerous interviews, and they may have felt compelled to give
different information." In general, there was an insufficient
search for corroborative evidence, and the stories of the children
in Jordan, Minnesota, changed from witnessing or suffering sexual
abuse to witnessing murders.' 2
The three cases mentioned are not exclusive and represent
only a sampling of newspaper headlines across the country. 3 If
the children are telling the truth, society is faced with a mon-
strously destructive plague that threatens to engulf us without
even a challenge to its power and control.
II. THE DILEMMA OF CREDIBILITY AND
CONFRONTATION
Can the children be trusted? Should reports of sexual abuse
from children be subjected to the strictures of credibility? If so,
should children be subjected to the emotional trauma of relating
the abuse from the witness stand and the rigors of cross-examina-
tion that may wilt most adults let alone the fragile ego of children?
On the question of credibility, studies have shown that chil-
dren are no more likely to lie than adults. 14 There is, however,
some research that suggests a parent can successfully coach a child
to make sexual abuse allegations against the other parent - the so-
called "sexual allegations in divorce syndrome."' 5  Children are
susceptible to suggestion but no more so than adults, at least
according to one study.' 6 Children may recall less than adults, but
they do not forget at a faster rate than adults insofar as their per-
related that her child saw defendant "Raymond Buckley fly and that her son had also been
molested by his father and a Los Angeles school board member." Id.
A lawyer whose two children were students at the McMartin school told investigators
about conduct related to him by his two children, including seeing animals killed, being
urinated on, being forced to eat feces, being forced to simulate sexual intercourse with
other children, and participating in ceremonies where people wore robes, used candles and
forced the children to drink blood. Id.
11. Id. at 60-61.
12. Id. Linda Wallace Pate, a Los Angeles attorney who represents child abuse victims,
stated: "It is not accepted as reality in this country. More people believe in UFO's than in
ritual abuse. When you talk about black robes and human sacrifices, the case goes out the
window." Id. at 62.
13. See J. JOHNSTON, THE EDGE OF EVIL (1989).
14. Weaver, The Competency of Children, 4 COOLEY L. REV. 522, 524-25 (1987Xciting
Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 1981 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 73, 80).
15. Weaver, supra note 14, at 525. The syndrome is characterized by the child relating
sexual incidents in language that is not in a child's vocabulary .and a lack of supporting
detail.
16. Goodman, Children's Testimony in Historical Pers pective, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 9
(1984).
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sonal experiences are concerned. 17
In a landmark study of child witnesses, researchers found that
mock trial jury panels believed child witnesses less than adults,
and the primary reason was perception." Adults perceive chil-
dren to be less credible because of the following: 1) the child's
powerless speech style; 2) low status of the child; and 3) the child's
lack of self-confidence.' 9
The study concluded that while credibility usually increases as
the age of the child increases, the opposite is true for children tes-
tifying in sexual abuse cases.20 The study found jurors are more
prone to believe a younger child because the young child does not
have sufficient experience or knowledge to fabricate a report of
sexual activity.2 '
Every witness is presumed to be competent.' If the compe-
tency of a child to testify is challenged, the issue must be deter-
mined by the court as a preliminary question outside the hearing
of the jury; the court must focus on the witnesses' ability to tell the
difference between truth and lying and determine the witnesses'
appreciation of the oath.'
It is basic human nature for children to love and respect their
parents. Hence, it is difficult for a child to turn against a parent
and testify in open court about sexual abuse allegedly inflicted by a
parent against the child. Not only does the child feel that she is
17. Bruner, The Course of Cognitive Growth, 19 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1 (1964). See also
Main, Holmes, Gath and Kovac, The Potential for Children as Eyewitnesses, 3 LAW AND
HUM. BEHAV. 295, 303 (1979).
18. Goodman, Golding, Helgeson, Haith and Michelli, When a Child Takes the Stand,
11 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 27, 28 (1987). A confident witness may be more believable, but
the confidence is not reliable. Defienbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence, 4 LAw
AND HUM. BEHAV. 243, 244-45 (1980).
19. Goodman, Golding, Helgeson, Haith and Michelli, When a Child Takes the Stand,
supra note 18, at 28. Adults may believe that children are more susceptible to suggestion or
that they may be manipulated into lying; the study concluded that:
We suspect that a variety of factors will affect adults' perception of the
credibility of children's testimony. These factors include: the type of trial (e.g.,
sexual assault versus murder); the role of the eyewitness (bystander, victim, or
perpetrator); individual differences among witnesses (e.g., sex, race, mental
health, demeanor); individual differences among jurors (e.g., sex, amount of
experience with children); and trial factors (e.g., attorney's tactics, use of expert
witnesses). Thus, we do not believe that children will always be viewed as less
credible witnesses than adults.
Id. at 37-38.
20. Id. at 38.
21. Id. The literature is in the developmental stage on the issue of credibility of
children, and one can certainly state that children's credibility is not a subject on which
there is universal agreement. As in every case, the credibility of each witness is for the trier
of fact to determine.
22. N.D. R. EVID. 601.
23. N.D. R. EVID. 104(a).
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betraying the parent, but she may have an almost disabling fear of
reprisal from the parent. This fear is all the more real when the
child must return to her home and face the reality that the offend-
ing parent may punish her.24
In an effort to minimize trauma to the child witness, there has
been a wide-ranging panoply of remedies proposed and enacted.
The purpose of these devices is to protect the child from the rigors
of facing the accused directly. For example, thirty-four states cur-
rently have statutes allowing out-of-court videotape depositions of
the child and twenty-three states have closed-circuit television for
"live" presentation at the trial.2 These procedures may ease the
child's emotional turmoil of facing the defendant, but prevent the
defendant from having face-to-face confrontation with the child
witness as guaranteed under the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution.2' The lack of the defendant's presence or his
hidden presence in the courtroom undoubtedly takes away the
impact of that presence on the testimony of the witness.2 One of
the tenets of our system of justice is that the accused should be
able to face his accusers and have them state their charges in his
presence. It is certainly easier to accuse someone when he is not
present or cannot be seen.2s
To eliminate some concern regarding the defendant's con-
frontational rights, other procedural innovations have been cre-
24. Cf. Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231, 232-33 (N.D. 198OXeighteen-year-old
daughter testified at incest trial of her father); State v. Olesen, 443 N.W.2d 8, 11 (S.D.
1989Xfive-year-old girl identified her father as the abuser). See also Bauer, Preparation of
the Sexually Abused Child for Court Testimony, 11 BULLETIN OF AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 287 (1983Xin addition to the trauma of facing the defendant in the
courtroom, the child faces repeated questioning before trial, the process of examination and
cross-examination during the trial, the official atmosphere of the court, and the possibility
that the defendant may be acquitted).
25. See Miller v. State, 517 N.E.2d 64, 69-70 (Ind. 1987Xlists state statutes). These
statutes and rules of court typically allow the child to be examined without being in the
presence or direct view of the defendant. Counsel for the defendant and the prosecutor
are present during the questioning of the child and the defendant must have access to
counsel during the questioning, although out of the child's sight.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution,
ratified on December 15, 1791, provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense. (emphasis supplied).
Id.
27. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2802 (1988Xforbidding placement of a screen
between child witness and defendant as violative of the sixth amendment confrontation
clause).
28. Id. at 2800-02.
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ated to place the accused and the child accuser in the same room
during questioning. In Coy v. Iowa, 9 screens were constructed
which, along with adjustments in the courtroom, would allow the
defendant to dimly see the child, but the child witness could not
see the defendant.30 The courtroom lights were dimmed and a
bright spotlight was directed at the screen, creating a dramatic
emphasis that was "eerie."13 ' The United States Supreme Court
found the device unconstitutional; the majority holding that the
defendant had a right of face-to-face confrontation. 2
In Mattox v. United States33 the Supreme Court held that the
primary purpose of the confrontation clause was to prevent trial
by ex parte affidavit where no cross-examination was possible. 4
The sixth amendment does not, however, always require face-
to-face confrontation. 5 There may be cases where the witness is
unavailable at the time of trial because of death or otherwise. In
such cases, testimony from a prior proceeding may, by necessity,
be used.36 In any case, either the witness must be produced or
unavailability shown.37
The face-to-face requirement is elusive. In California v.
Green,38 the United States Supreme Court emphasized the impor-
tance of permitting the jury to observe the witness and weigh her
credibility, but did not emphasize the defendant's right to impose
his presence on the witness.39
Whether the primary purpose of the confrontation clause is to
guarantee cross-examination, or to obtain demeanor evidence, or
to secure ". . . a certain subjective moral effect ... upon the wit-
ness," 40 the end result is to promote "reliability in criminal tri-
als."'4 1 The critical issue then, is whether screening devices (with
29. 108 S.Ct. 2798 (1988).
30. Id. at 2799.
31. Id. at 2810.
32. Id. at 2803. Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion, joined by Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall and Stevens.
There is no "confrontation" clause in the North Dakota Constitution, but the sixth
amendment is made applicable to the states by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342
(1963).
33. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
34. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895). The infamous "trial" of Sir
Walter Raleigh, convicted of treason in 1603 on the basis of ex parte affidavits, was the
primary motivation in enacting the sixth amendment. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308
(1974).
35. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980).
36. Id. at 72-73.
37. Id. at 66.
38. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
39. Id. at 158.
40. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395 (1X2) (1974).
41. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986).
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their attendant theatrical atmosphere), out-of-court depositions
(where neither the defendant nor the jury are in the witnesses'
presence or sight), or closed-circuit television (where the witness
appears in an anteroom during the trial before the attorneys and
her image is relayed to television screens in the courtroom) will
advance the reliability factors in criminal trials. The answer is not
readily apparent and it is impossible to generalize a solution.
When considering the issue of protecting the child witness from
the trauma of confronting the defendant during her testimony,
the court must engage in an analysis which balances the compet-
ing interests of the child and the defendant's right to a fair trial.
The Supreme Court performed a balancing exercise in Coy. 42
The majority quoted from the Bible43 and Shakespeare. 44 Justice
Scalia quickly concluded, "we have never doubted, therefore, that
the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant to face-to-face
meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact. " 45 The
majority found no difficulty in holding that there was a right of
face-to-face confrontation, but Justice Scalia added that the wit-
ness is not compelled to fix her gaze on the defendant, locked eye
to eye.46 To the contrary, the witness may specifically look else-
where, but Scalia noted that"... the trier of fact will draw its own
conclusions. 47
The trial court had erected a protective screen in Coy to pro-
tect the child witness from the assumed traumatic effect of con-
frontation with the alleged perpetrator, a neighbor of the child.48
However, there was no individualized or particularized findings
made by the trial court that the child would, in fact, suffer emo-
tional damage by testifying face-to-face in the presence of the
defendant.49 The majority found that one of the very purposes of
the face-to-face confrontation was to create a degree of tension in
the witness to inhibit false testimony.5 0
42. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2802.
43. Id. at 2800. Acts 25:16 states: "It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any
man up to die before the accused has met his accusers face to face, and has been given a
chance to defend himself against the charges." Id.
44. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2800. In Richard II, Act I, sc. 1, King Richard II states: 'Then call
them to our presence - face to face, and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear the
accuser and the accused freely speak .... Id.
45. Id. at 2800. Justice Scalia cited approvingly Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730
(1987), where the Supreme Court held that the functional purpose of the confrontation
clause is effective cross-examination. Id. at 2802.
46. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2802.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2802-03.
49. Id. at 2802.
50. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2802. Justice Scalia noted: "That face-to-face presence may,
585
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The majority in Coy therefore clearly enunciated the rule that
face-to-face confrontation is the norm, and any exceptions would
have to await future development on a case by case basis.51 No
generalized statutory finding of trauma t6 child witnesses is suffi-
cient to avoid the required confrontation.-2 Only particularized
factual findings showing that the individual child witness needs
protection will suffice.5 3 In other words, some trauma is to be
expected, but the court does not answer the next question - How
much does the child have to suffer before overcoming the defend-
ant's right of confrontation?
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice White, wrote a concurring
opinion in Coy.54 Justice O'Connor reviewed the patchwork quilt
of state statutory schemes on use of videotape depositions and
closed-circuit television and noted that thirty-three states allow
videotape depositions, and usually the defendant is allowed to be
in the same room as the child deponent.55 It makes little sense
from a protection against emotional trauma standpoint, to allow
the defendant to sit in the same room, within the distance of a
table top away, with an unobstructed view of the child and expect
that the child will gain any protection. In fact, such a procedure
may be extremely harmful and eminently more difficult for the
child to endure. Closed-circuit television, where the child testifies
outside the courtroom and out of the immediate presence of the
defendant, would give much more protection.
Justice O'Connor and Justice White also emphasized the pre-
ferred approach of face-to-face confrontation, albeit not abso-
lute. 6 There may be competing interests that outweigh that
"preferred approach," r5 7 but there must be an important public
policy entitled to protection, such as protection of child wit-
nesses.58 In each instance, there must be a "case-specific finding of
necessity."' 59 No guidance is furnished on the degree of harm to
unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it may
confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult. It
is a truism that constitutional protections have costs." Id.




55. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2804.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,63-64 and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284, 295 (1973)).
58. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2805.
59. Id.
586 [Vol. 66:579
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the child before the extraordinary means of witness protection is
allowable and denial of face-to-face confrontation is justified.
Justices Blackman and Rehnquist dissented in Coy, arguing
that only the fact finder has the right to observe the witness, not
the defendant.60
Coy put to rest the issue of whether the confrontation clause
required face-to-face testimony, thereby vindicating certain of the
federal and state courts that had previously so held.6 1 The
Supreme Court did not, however, provide specific guidance as to
the degree of harm necessary to the testifying child to justify the
use of extraordinary protective devices. The issue becomes
whether the level of trauma must reach the stage where the wit-
ness is unable to testify, and therefore is "unavailable,"6 2 or if sub-
stantial emotional trauma, short of depriving the child of the
ability to testify, is sufficient to trigger the protective devices. 3
The requirement of individual, or "case specific" findings is
not new in this area. In 1982, the Supreme Court held that the
news media could not be excluded from the courtroom when a
child victim testified without a particularized showing that the
presence of the press would be unduly harmful to the child.6 4
Among the factors to be considered are age of the child, psycho-
logical maturity and understanding, desires of the victim, and the
interests of parents and relatives.65
60. Id. at 2806. Justices Blackman and Rehnquist argued for Wigmore's view that the
right of confrontation was not for the "idle purpose of gazing upon one another," but was
designed to assure the right of the jury or court to observe the demeanor of the witness and
to thereby determine credibility. Id. at 2807. The dissent was convinced that the problem
of child abuse was serious enough to warrant the use of screens in the instant case and that
it should not be necessary to make case-specific findings of trauma. Id. at 2809. In effect,
the dissent argued for a per se rule that whenever a child witness took the stand in abuse
cases, unacceptable trauma to the child would result and the testimony would be less than
effective because of intimidation. Id. The truth finding function of the trial would thus be
compromised. Id.
Finally, the dissent pointed out that it would be unfair to require particularized
findings in each case when such findings are not required for the admission of hearsay such
as business records, excited utterances, and statements of a co-conspirator. Id. at 2809, n.6.
61. See United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979); Hochheiser v.
Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
62. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
63. Note, Videotaping Children's Testimony, 85 MICH. L. REV. 809, 820 (1987). The
extreme recommendation has been made that no live testimony of the child should be
permitted. Id. A "litigation video" would be taken during the initial investigation, with
questions agreed to in advance by the prosecutor and defense counsel. Id. at 819. The
video interview would be conducted by a non-attorney who would be an expert in child
development and psychology and no cross-examination would be permitted. Id. In view of
Coy, this proposal, although having merit, would certainly fail to pass constitutional tests.
64. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982).
65. Id. Globe Newspaper was decided on first amendment grounds and the Supreme
Court had different values to balance against the rights of the child witness. When children
are involved as victims, the Supreme Court has found the balance to weight more favorably
587
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Since Coy, state cases have proliferated at a rapid rate
attempting to fill the gaps left by Coy. The decisions generally rec-
ognize that protection of children is a valid public policy to justify
a denial of face-to-face confrontation, but the degree of harm and
its effect on the ability to testify seem to be unclear. The cases
take two basic approaches.
Some courts state that the degree of harm to the child must be
so substantial as to actually prevent the child from being able to
reasonably communicate, similar to the "unavailability" test set
out by Ohio v. Roberts.6 Other state courts refer to the individual
harm that would be suffered by the child, but not in terms of ren-
dering the child unable to testify. It is apparently sufficient if the
degree of harm is such as would cause serious problems for the
child.
In State v. Eaton,6 7 the Kansas Supreme Court found that
extraordinary devices could be used in the event that the child
would suffer an injury substantially greater than "normal" or
"average."' e  This begs the ultimate question, however, and pro-
vides little basis for comparison. This gut level determination
toward children than the freedom of speech. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944Xcase involving statute prohibiting children from selling periodicals on the street;
court held constitutional as against a claim of violation of religious freedom); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968XCourt found that state may regulate sale of sexual
material to minor even though such material would not be obscene for adults); F.C.C. v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978XCourt found that FCC could regulate
broadcast of George Carlin's monologue, "Filthy Words," to prevent children from being
exposed to it); and New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765, 774 (1982XCourt allowed New
York to prohibit the promotion of sexual performances by children and found that no
violation of first amendment freedom of speech was present).
66. Ohio, 448 U.S. at 66. See State v. Vincent, 768 P.2d 150, 164 (Ariz. 1989); Craig v.
State, 544 A.2d 784, 797 (Md. 1988); State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 1989);
and State v. Lindner, 419 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). Compare State v. Gilberg,
326 N.W.2d 744, 751 (Wis. 1982). Similarly, Connecticut courts require a showing that the
child would be so intimidated by the presence of the defendant as to seriously call into
question the "trustworthiness" of the witnesses' testimony. State v. Bonello, 554 A.2d 277,
281 (Conn. 1989). This is the "compelling need" that must be found by clear and
convincing evidence by the court before allowing any protective device. Id. at 280-82.
"Trustworthiness" is defined in terms of refusal of the child to testify, or distorted testimony
caused by threats or feelings of guilt. Id. at 281.
67. 769 P.2d 1157 (Kan. 1989).
68. Id. at 1167. The Kansas Supreme Court also listed the following considerations: 1)
probability of psychological injury; 2) degree of injury; and, 3) expected duration of injury.
Id. See also State v. Crandall, 555 A.2d 35, 38 (N.W. Super. A. D. 1989Xcourt held that
.severe emotional or mental distress" is the test; there is no mention of the effect of the
distress on the ability to communicate). An Iowa case is supportive of the view that the
ability to communicate is not the issue, but rather injury suffered by the child required to
testify is dispositive. State v. Hoversteen, 437 N.W.2d 240, 241 (Iowa 1989). In Hoversteen,
the court held that the use of a one-way mirror where the defendant could see the witness,
was justified when the child had suffered "horrendous and painful abuse" and had post-
traumatic stress syndrome. Id. at 242. The court recognized that protections were
necessary to avoid further trauma, but no mention was made of the effect of the stress on
the child's ability to communicate. See also In the Interest of J.D.S., 436 N.W.2d 342, 347
(Iowa 1989).
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makes for difficult appellate review and gives the trial court wide
latitude and discretion.
Other courts have taken yet other approaches in deciding that
"eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation is not required. Rather than
placing a screen or mirror between the child and the defendant or
using videotape out-of-court depositions or closed-circuit televi-
sion in court, some jurisdictions permit the child to sit at an angle
to the defendant 9 or to have the child seated at a table facing the
jury.70 These directional deviations are apparently permissible
under Coy, so long as there is no artificial barrier placed between
the witness and the defendant1.7 Because the confrontation clause
would not be violated, there would be no need to make any find-
ings as to particularized need (case specific), or that the child
would suffer any degree of emotional harm.
The fact finders can consider the directional, arrangement in
the courtroom as part of the credibility issue, but it seems far pref-
erable to use this technique of directional deviation as the least
restrictive means available to protect the witness and the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial. This assumes, of course, that merely
averting eye contact will be a sufficient remedy to allow the child
to testify in an effective manner. The trial court must carefully
assess the child's testimonial capability and consider the possibility
of emotional trauma. In addition, the trial court must make a com-
plete record of the factual and legal findings and conclusions sup-
porting the remedies used to protect the child and preserve the
availability and trustworthiness of the testimony. Expert opinion
can certainly be relied upon to show the degree of harm that the
child could suffer if no protections were instituted.72
The best approach would seem to be the rule adopted by
Maryland, where protective measures for the child witness are
authorized by code when: "The judge determines that testimony
by the child victim in the courtroom will result in the child suffer-
ing serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reason-
ably communicate."' 73 Emphasis should be placed on "reasonably"
as the balancing factor. Absolute incapacity to testify should not
be required before denial of face-to-face confrontation, rather the
requirement should focus on a level of stress that prevents the
69. Ortiz v. State, 374 S.E.2d 92, 94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
70. People v. Tuck, 537 N.Y.S.2d 355, 356 (A.D. 4th 1989).
71. State v. Murray, 375 S.E.2d 405, 412 (W. Va. 1988).
72. Craig v. State, 544 A.2d 784, 801 (Md. App. 1988).
73. See MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. Pnoc. § 9-102(aXii).
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child from testifying freely and effectively. The "functional pur-
pose" of the confrontation clause is still the opportunity for effec-
tive cross-examination.74 It is not for the purpose of intimidating
the child by the presence of the defendant to prevent her from
testifying, in direct as well as cross-examination.
North Dakota does not have any statute allowing for video-
tape depositions, closed-circuit television, one-way mirrors,
screens, or similar mechanical devices designed to protect the
child witness from the stress of facing the defendant while testify-
ing.7 5 However, since Coy the North Dakota Supreme Court has
considered the sixth amendment right to a public trial. In State v.
Klein,76 the supreme court held that the trial court could not close
the trial, involving child sexual abuse to the public over the
defendant's objection.77 The Klem court relied in part on Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal.,78 in which the United
States Supreme Court declared a presumption of openness of trials
which could be overcome only "... by an overriding interest based
on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest."79 The United States
Supreme Court went on to say that "[n]o right ranks higher than
the right of an accused to a fair trial.. ." and that there was a ...
community therapeutic value" in an open trial.'
Notwithstanding the strong interest in maintaining an open
trial, a right adopted for the benefit of the defendant, 8' the North
Dakota Supreme Court found that the public interest of protect-
ing ". . . the physical and psychological well-being of minor vic-
tiros "s2 was compelling and would justify closure of the trial, but
only if a particularized determination was made by the trial court
that such a departure from normal procedure was necessary to
74. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987).
75. On October 25, 1989, the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted an amendment,
effective March 1, 1990, to Rule 803(24) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. The
amendment allows a hearsay exception in sexual abuse cases for child witnesses under
twelve years of age experiencing or witnessing sexual abuse. Hearsay statements of the
child related by third parties at the trial or other proceeding are admissible if the court
finds, in a preliminary hearing, that the statement is trustworthy and the child either
testifies at the proceeding, or is unavailable to testify and there is corroborative evidence of
the act described in the statement. N.D.R. EVID. 803(24).
76. 438 N.W.2d 798 (N.D. 1989).
77. State v. Klein, 438 N.W.2d 798, 800 (N.D. 1989).
78. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
79. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 801 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S.
501, 510 (1984)).
80. Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 508.
81. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984).
82. Klein, 438 N.W.2d at 801.
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protect the child."-
The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that a balanc-
ing process must be used and that the right of the defendant to an
open public trial could not be trivialized by a general desire on the
trial court's part to provide the most pleasant atmosphere possible
for the child.14 Obviously, the precise limits cannot be pre-set,
and the balancing process must be left to the sound discretion of
the trial court, with the caveat that particularized or case specific
findings must be made so that there can be meaningful appellate
review on the issue of abuse of discretion.
III. THE ROLE OF RULE 611(a) IN THE SEARCH FOR
TRUTH
The right of effective cross-examination is the "functional pur-
pose" to be served by the sixth amendment.' The ability of the
child to testify and be cross-examined is certainly affected by the
very presence of the defendant, especially in cases of intrafamilial
abuse, where there is a continuing relationship between the
abused child and the alleged abuser. It is not therefore surprising
that the courts have given considerable attention to the threshold
issue of whether the child should be required to testify in the full
view of the defendant, and whether the presence of the defendant
is sufficiently traumatic to the child so as to prevent the child from
being able to reasonably communicate. If the child needs to have
protective screens, one-way mirrors, closed-circuit television or a
videotape deposition86 in order to testify, the least possible
infringement on the right of face-to-face confrontation must be
achieved.
Once the child is on the stand and offering testimony, with or
without viewing the defendant, there is no question that counsel
for the defendant has the right to cross-examination. The opportu-
83. Id.
84. Id. at 802. It is not a stress-free atmosphere for the child that is required, but
rather a finding that the "overriding interest" of protecting the child from physical or
psychological harm was serious enough to justify closure.
85. Stincer v. Kentucky, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987).
86. State v. Thomas, 442 N.W.2d 10, 17 (Wis. 1989). The Wisconsin Supreme Court
approved the use of an out-of-court videotape deposition of a child witness who had been
allegedly sexually abused by the defendant who was babysitting the victim. Id. More
importantly, the court approved the use of a screen to be placed between the child and the
defendant during the testimony. Id. at 18. The child was able to testify and be cross-
examined, and the defendant was able to be present. Id. This procedure seems even far
more preferable to closed-circuit television or an in-court screen, as in Coy, because in a
videotape deposition, the jury is not aware of the screen and only the child is shown. There
is no visual impact of a screening device which might create some bias or prejudice against
the defendant.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
nity for the trial court to control cross-examination is clearly stated
in Rule 611(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence:
(a) Control by Court. The Court shall exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of interrogating wit-
nesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertain-
ment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time,
and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.8 7
Rule 611(a) is patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which is a codification of common law principles.88 The Rule
emphasizes that the primary responsibility for controlling the trial
process lies with the court, and the trial judge is given a considera-
ble latitude in determining the methods of presenting evidence.8 9
There is nothing to suggest that Rule 611(a) could not be used as
the legal authority for the use of screens or other protective
devices for the benefit of the child witness.
Rule 611(a) specifically allows the court to control cross-exami-
nation to preclude harassing or unduly embarrassing a witness. No
clearer duty can be imagined for the trial judge to control the
manner of cross-examination than in the case of an intimidated
child witness. Few adults can withstand the withering cross-exam-
ination of an experienced trial attorney, and it is all the more true
in the case of a small child who is unfamiliar with adult procedures
and the adversarial nature of the trial process.
In essence, the trial court must try to strike a balance between
the parties' right of effective cross-examination and the child wit-
ness' right to protection from overzealous and intimidating tactics.
The Rule has as its goal the "ascertainment of truth,"' 0 not the
destruction of the witness' composure. The trial judge can limit
the time for examination, either direct or cross-examination, and
the type of questions in order to avoid harassing or unduly embar-
rassing the witness. The test is an objective one and if the individ-
ual child witness is extremely sensitive and reticent, the trial court
should be responsive to the need for control of cross-examination.
The danger, of course, is that the trial judge will overzealously
protect the child and cut off cross-examination prematurely or
87. N.D. R. EvID. 611(a).
88. JOSEPH & STALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA, § 45.3 (1987).
89. Id.
90. N.D. R. EVID. 611(a).
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severely limit the type of questions and the manner in which they
are asked. In other words, the opportunity for effective cross-
examination guaranteed under the sixth amendment is illusory if
the cross-examiner must "water down" the inquiry and the
method of inquiry until the purpose of cross-examination is nulli-
fied. However, the invocation of Rule 611(a) will not serve as a
shield against well-placed objections by the defendant, and the
balancing process under Rule 611(a) is no less precarious a task
than under the physical confrontation issue addressed by Coy and
the court closure issue addressed by Waller.9 1 The trial court must
clearly articulate its reasons for deviating from normal trial proce-
dure so that the "community therapeutic value" of an open trial
on the merits, with all cylinders of the judicial engine firing in
proper sequence and with full vigor, is not emasculated. The
defendant's right to a fair trial is conceded as a right of the highest
order.9 2
Notwithstanding the defendant's right to a fair trial, the trial
court has the inherent power pursuant to Rule 611(a), to control
courtroom procedure, as well as the parties and witnesses. 3 The
search for truth under Rule 611(a) may require other means to
achieve that end. It has been held, for example, that allowing a
close relative to hold the child on her lap during testimony is per-
missible so long as the relative does not influence the child's
91. Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.
92. Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 508.
93. The North Dakota Supreme Court has ruled that a trial court is afforded great
latitude and discretion in conducting a trial and, absent an abuse of discretion, its decision
on matters relating to the conduct of a trial will not be set aside on appeal. E.g., Ward v.
Shipp, 340 N.W.2d 14, 17 (N.D. 1983). Thus, a trial court has broad discretion to allow
additional time for the arrival of a witness. Id. A trial court may also permit the reopening
of a case for clarification of the record. Leno v. Ehli, 339 N.W.2d 92, 96 (N.D. 1983). In
addition, a court may sua sponte order a supplemental hearing for the taking of further
evidence. Tom Beuchler Const. v. City of Williston, 392 N.W.2d 403, 404 (N.D. 1986). A
trial court's discretion must be exercised in a manner which comports with substantial
justice because a trial is a search for the truth. Ward, 340 N.W.2d at 18. A trial court abuses
its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable manner. Wall v.
Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co., 274 N.W.2d 208, 218 (N.D. 1979); Great Plains Supply Co.
v. Erickson, 398 N.W.2d 732, 734 (N.D. 1986). See also State v. Schimmel, 409 N.W.2d 335,
340 (N.D. 1987Xheld that it was proper for the trial court to caution the wife of the
defendant to refrain from making gestures to the defendant who was then testifying on the
stand). In Schimmel, the defendant's wife was shaking her head and giving other body
language clues to her husband as each question was asked. Id. The defendant's wife was
seated in the spectator section of the courtroom. Id. The court noted that:
rThe trial court is charged with maintaining decorum in the courtroom so that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary is preserved... [w]hile the trial
court shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to those with whom it deals, it
also must maintain reasonable control over the mode of interrogating witnesses
in order to ensure ascertainment of the truth.
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testimony.94
The use of anatomical dolls is also a Rule 611(a) means to
achieving the goal of finding the truth, but the trial court must not
allow the use of the dolls unless it is demonstrated that such use is
necessary to elicit testimony from the witness and the dolls are not
presented in a suggestive manner.95
The court has considerable latitude in making the courtroom
more hospitable to the child witness if, by doing so, the child is
better enabled to give testimony. Certainly, this is an inherent
power of the court both at common law96 and arguably under Rule
611(a), which provides that the "mode" of presenting evidence
may be reasonably controlled by the court.
Other suggestions have been made by trial court judges to
make the courtroom more "user friendly" for children including
the following:
1) using children's furniture (i.e., small tables and chairs
placed in front of the bench, and the judge sits at the small table
with the child and the attorney);
2) removing the judicial robe while the child is testifying to
avoid intimidation;
3) setting ground rules for attorneys before the trial, includ-
ing maintenance of a clear zone around the child witness where
the lawyer may not step, cautioning against raising voices,
obtaining stipulations concerning use of leading questions, and
using simple language;
4) setting a procedure for making objections to minimize dis-
ruptions and intimidation of the child; and
5) being sensitive to the needs of the child and having fre-
quent rest breaks, as well as considering school schedules. 97
IV. CONCLUSION
Constitutional rights do have their costs. The cost of the sixth
amendment to children is a stressful courtroom environment that
94. Commonwealth v. Pankraz, 554 A.2d 974, 979 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
95. State v. Jenkens, 326 N.W.2d 67, 70 (N.D. 1982). Leading questions may also be
used to elicit testimony from a timid or otherwise reluctant witness under Rule 611(c) of the
North Dakota Rules of Evidence. See also United States v. Littlewind, 511 F.2d 244, 245
(8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Nabors, 762 F.2d 642, 650 (8th Cir. 1985).
96. State v. Gilbert, 326 N.W.2d 744, 752 (Wis. 1982).
97. These suggestions were made by Judge Paul A. Chernoff and Judge John C.
Cratsley of the Massachusetts Superior Court in Cambridge and Boston, Massachusetts,
respectively, and Margot Botsford, an attorney from Miami, Florida, at the Domestic
Violence/Child Abuse Regional Program presented by the National Judicial College of
Reno, Nevada, at Fargo, North Dakota, on October 6-8, 1988.
594 [Vol. 66:579
1990] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN CHILD ABUSE CASES
seems alien and hostile. The worst fear of any trial court is to cre-
ate an atmosphere for the child that is as traumatic and psychologi-
cally damaging as the abusive acts suffered at the hands of the
alleged abuser. As with all constitutional balancing acts, the trial
court is subjected to making instant decisions without showing bias
or prejudice for or against any of the trial participants.
Because of the tender sensitivities of child sexual abuse vic-
tims, there is no substitute for a guardian ad litem for the child.9"
The guardian ad litem's role is to ".... support the child and advo-
cate for the protection of the child."' One of the primary benefits
from appointment of a representative for the child is the assurance
that the child is represented and appropriate requests will be
made for protection of the child. The child will also have moral
support from the representative.
Even with a guardian ad litem representing the child, the
issues are not easily decided, especially in the context of an adver-
sarial criminal proceeding. The ultimate solution may well lie in
the formulation of a whole new set of civil judicial remedies for
child sexual abuse. Because most abuse happens within the family
unit, it seems appropriate to develop civil proceedings for
intrafamilial cases without the usual constitutional protections and
requirements found in criminal cases. Civil proceedings, as an
alternative to criminal actio., have the disadvantage of eliminat-
ing incarceration as an end result, but one must question whether
incarceration of the offender, or treatment of the victim and the
offender, and the family unit as a whole is the preferred goal.
Treatment can be ordered in civil proceedings for alcoholism,
drug addiction, and mental illness. 10 If child sexual abuse cases
were processed in the civil area, many, if not most, of the
problems discussed in this article would be nonexistent. More-
over, if appropriate treatment was ordered for all concerned, the
ultimate cost to society and the individual child would be far less
than under the present system. The benefits to a family restored
to mental and emotional health would be of far greater worth than
the "community therapeutic value"' 0 ' attached to a criminal trial.
The children are waiting for our answer.
98. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-16 (Supp. 1989).
99. Id.
100. See N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 25-03.1 (1989).
101. Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 508.
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POSTSCRIPT
Since completion of this article, the United States Supreme
Court decided Maryland v. Craig.10 2 The decision was written by
Justice O'Connor and rendered on June 27, 1990. The Court held
that the one-way closed circuit television procedure outlined in
Section 9-102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code of the
Maryland Code Annotated was constitutional. It is noted previ-
ously in this article that this procedure is the preferred procedure
since it does contain numerous safeguards for the defendant while
also considering the special needs of the child witness.
The Supreme Court held that face to face confrontation is pre-
ferred, as noted in the Coy decision, but is not absolutely required
so long as an important public policy was furthered and case spe-
cific findings were made requiring protection for the child witness.
Other safeguards would be available for testing reliability of the
testimony, including the determination of competency of the wit-
ness, administration of an oath, an opportunity for the fact finder
to observe the demeanor of the witness, and allowing the defend-
ant to cross examine the witness.
While Coy decided that the states could eliminate face to face
confrontation under proper circumstances, Craig answers some of
the questions left by Coy. First, the Court decided that there must
be a case specific finding that the child would be traumatized by
the presence of the defendant, not merely by the court process;
second the trauma suffered by the child must be more than simple
nervousness, excitement, or reluctance to testify; and third the
case specific finding need not be made after the child has
attempted to testify in the physical presence of the defendant; but
the trial court can make the findings based on expert and other
testimony before the child takes the witness stand.
Craig does not conclusively put to rest all of the questions
regarding face to face confrontation. For example, the Court did
not approve any substitute other than the procedure outlined in
the Maryland statute of one-way closed circuit television. With
the approval of this device in Craig, it is likely that many more
states will follow its lead. Such a procedure, however, is expensive
and many trial courts are without sufficient facilities to allow for
the use of closed circuit television. Obviously, the further devel-
opment of acceptable means of protecting the child witness while
102. 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed. 2d 666 (1990), 1990 U.S. LEXIS 3457.
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still giving the defendant the essence of his sixth amendment
rights will require more litigation in the future.
The children's voices have been heard, and the Court contin-
ues to heed the clear cry for protection of children in sexual abuse
cases. The courts must not look back, but must continue to move
forward and further provide for the welfare of those who are least
able to protect themselves.

